blue tangle

  After the last two blog entries about winPEAS.bat related detections I figured we'd take a look at the pre-compiled binary version. Oh and we get this last pea related punny blog title, for now. First of all we have winPEAS retrieving local Wi-Fi profile details, potentially a pre-cursor to retrieving network security keys. We can hunt for this behaviour: index=winlogs EventCode=4688 (Process_Command_Line=*powershell.exe* OR Process_Command_Line="*wlan show profiles*") | stats min(_time) AS earliest max(_time) AS latest count(Process_Command_Line) AS Count values(Process_Command_Line) AS Process_Command_Line BY Creator_Process_Name | convert ctime(earliest) ctime(latest) | where Count > 1 | table earliest latest Count Creator_Process_Name Process_Command_Line     This is what it looks like in Splunk:      Other reconnaissance tools and legitimate user behaviour may introduce false positives here, though checking for Wi-Fi profiles on say a Windows server or des

  Last post we looked at winPEAS traces left in logs using Splunk and Windows security event logging and guess what we are doing this time? More of the same, these are potential security alerts or a jumping off point for some threat hunting.    What prompted me looking at PEAS-ng, Watson and dazzleUP is that they are all featured in one of the rounds of Conti ransomware gang leaks.    I'll be trying to cover all three red team tools in some depth, with some SPL. If you are using a different SIEM you can use what I have here to inspire your own detections, just go with your heart. winPEAS performs extensive reconnaissance on Windows endpoints to provide some guidance on potential privilege escalation paths for adversaries, as before we are looking at the batchfile implementation of winPEAS, though it also comes in pre-compiled binaries and there is a Powershell version floating around as well.   Part of this discovery/recon process involves using Windows native tool findstr.exe t