blue tangle

  Following on from reading an unSafe.sh post about recent Lockbit ransomware gang activity, aka the new "Lockbit Black", I decided to look into a file that was posted along with the analysis, "123.bat".   You can view or grab a gist of the batch file below: We're going to run this batch file on a test VM and have a look at the resulting logs for some detection ideas, I'll be giving examples in Splunk SPL but I am certain with a little SIEM magic you can adapt the content to elastic, Sentinel or Defender Advanced Hunting queries instead. Lets get to it. The first questions we have to ask though, are around log availability and log visibility.  Are you ingesting Windows EventID 4688 and command line parameters along with that? How about logs from Powershell? If you are still running an older version of Powershell in your estate and finding motivation to update to 5+ is tough then here's your driver, better security and better logs that you can bung i

  Quick blog entry on detections for the Ghostpack discovery/reconnaissance tool Seatbelt . This entry will focus on looking at command line parameters that can be caught even if the executable itself is renamed, if I have time we can delve into other event log artefacts another time. From the Seatbelt github repo: Seatbelt is a C# project that performs a number of security oriented host-survey "safety checks" relevant from both offensive and defensive security perspectives. So essentially what the tool does is retrieve local system information that might have security or safety implications. In terms of commands that can be tacked on to Seatbelt there are a literal ton of options. But what we are going to focus on here are the command groups, which break the many, many available commands down into categories, so we have: All, User, System, Slack, Chromium, Remote, Misc. The groups above are invoked like this, if you wanted to run all checks: Seatbelt.exe -group=all And so